Abstract-"THIS PAPER IS ELIGIBLE FOR THE STU-DENT PAPER AWARD" We consider the level of information security provided by random linear network coding in network scenarios in which all nodes comply with the communication protocols yet are assumed to be potential eavesdroppers (i.e. "nice but curious"). For this setup, which differs from wiretapping scenarios considered previously, we develop a natural algebraic security criterion, and prove several of its key properties. A preliminary analysis of the impact of network topology on the overall network coding security, in particular for complete directed acyclic graphs, is also included.
I. INTRODUCTION
Under the classical networking paradigm, in which intermediate nodes are only allowed to store and forward packets, information security is usually viewed as an independent feature with little or no relation to other communication tasks. In fact, since intermediate nodes receive exact copies of the sent packets, data confidentiality is commonly ensured by cryptographic means at higher layers of the protocol stack. Breaking with the ruling paradigm, network coding allows intermediate nodes to mix information from different data flows [1] , [2] and thus provides an intrinsic level of data security arguably one of the least well understood benefits of network coding.
Previous work on this issue has been mostly concerned with constructing codes capable of spliting the data among different links, such that reconstruction by a wiretapper is either very difficult or impossible. In [3] , the authors present a secure linear network code that achieves perfect secrecy against an attacker with access to a limited number of links. A similar problem is considered in [4] , featuring a random coding approach in which only the input vector is modified. [5] introduces a different information-theoretic security model, in which a system is deemed to be secure if an eavesdropper is unable to get any decoded or decodable (also called meaningful) source data. Still focusing on wiretapping attacks, [6] provides a simple security protocol exploiting the network topology: an attacker is shown to be unable to get any L. Lima (luisalima@ieee.org) and J. Barros meaningful information unless it can access those links that are necessary for the communication between the legitimate sender and the receiver, who are assumed to be using network coding. As a distributed capacity-achieving approach for the multicast case, randomized network coding [7] , [8] has been shown to extend naturally to packet networks with losses [9] and Byzantine modifications (both detection and correction [10] , [11] , [12] , [13] ). [14] adds a cost criterion to the secure network coding problem, providing heuristic solutions for a coding scheme that minimizes both the network cost and the probability that the wiretapper is able to retrieve all the messages of interest.
In this work, we approach network coding security from a different angle: our focus is not on the threat posed by external wiretappers but on the more general threat posed by intermediate nodes. We assume that the network consists entirely of "nice but curious" nodes, i.e. they comply with the communication protocols (in that sense, they are wellbehaved) but may try to acquire as much information as possible from the data that passes through them (in which case, they are potentially malicious). This notion is highlighted in the following example. As a preliminary step towards understanding the interplay between network topology and security against eavesdropping nodes, we present a rigorous characterization of the achievable level of algebraic security for this class of complete graphs. The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. First, a formal problem statement is in Section II, followed by a detailed analysis of the algebraic security of Randomized Linear Network Coding in Section III. In Section IV, this analysis is carried out specifically for complete directed acyclic graphs. The paper concludes with Section V.
II. PROBLEM SETUP
We adopt the network model of [2] : we represent the network as an acyclic directed graph G = (V, E), where V is the set of nodes and E is the set of edges. Edges are denoted by round brackets e = (v, v') C E, in which v = head(e) and v' = tail(e). The set of edges that end at a vertex v C V is denoted by FI (v) = {e £ : head(e) = v}, and the in-degree of the vertex is 51(v) IFI(v)l; similarly, the set of edges originating at a vertex v C V is denoted by Fo(v) = {e C E: tail(e) = v}, the out-degree being represented by 6o0(v) = FO(v)lDiscrete random processes XI, ...XK are observable at one or more source nodes. To simplify the analysis, we shall consider that each network link is free of delays and that there are no losses. Moreover, the capacity of each link is one bit per unit time, and the random processes Xi have a constant entropy rate of one bit per unit time. Edges with larger capacities are modelled as parallel edges and sources of larger entropy rate are modelled as multiple sources at the same node. We shall consider multicast connections as it is the most general type of single connection; there are d > 1 receiver nodes. The objective is to transmit all the source processes to each of the receiver nodes.
In linear network coding, edge e = (v, u) carries the process Y(e), which is defined below:
Y(e) 1 :Xl generated at v cvi,eX(v, l)+ E I e':head(e')=tail(e) 8e',eY(e/)
The transfer matrix M describes the relationship between an input vector x and an output vector z, z = xM; M = A(I -F)-lBT, where A and B represent, respectively, the linear mixings of the input vector and of the output vector, and have sizes K x £EJ and v x BEJ. F is the adjacency matrix of the directed labelled line graph corresponding to the graph G. In this paper we shall not consider matrix B, which only refers to the decoding at the receivers. Thus, we shall mainly analyse parts of the matrix AG, such that G = (I -F)-1; ai and ci denote column i of A and AG, respectively. We define the partial transfer matrix Mr,,(,) (also called auxiliary encoding vector [9] ) as the observable matrix at a given node v, i.e. the observed matrix formed by the symbols received at a node v. This is equivalent to the fraction of the data that an intermediate node has access to in a multicast transmission.
Regarding the coding scheme, we consider the random linear network coding scheme introduced in [7] : and thus each coefficient of the matrices described above is chosen independently and uniformly over all elements of a finite field Fq, q = 2.
Our goal is to evaluate the intrinsic security of random linear network coding, in multicast scenarios where all the intermediate nodes in the network are potentially malicious eavesdroppers. Specifically our threat model assumes that intermediate nodes perform the coding operations as outlined above, and will try to decode as much data as possible.
III. ALGEBRAIC SECURITY OF RANDOM LINEAR NETWORK CODING
A. Algebraic security
The Shannon criterion for information-theoretic security [15] corresponds in general terms to a zero mutual information between the cypher-text (C) and the original message (M), i.e. I(M; C) = 0. This condition implies that an attacker must guess < H(M) symbols to be able to compromise the data. With network coding, on the other hand, if the attacker is capable of guessing M symbols, K-M additional observed symbols are required for decoding by noting that each received symbol is a linear combination of the K message symbols from the source, we can see that a receiver must receive K coded symbols in order to recover one message symbol. Thus, as will be shown later, restricted rank sets of individual symbols do not translate into immediately decodable data with high probability. This notion is illustrated in Figure 2 (1) when the partial transfer matrix has full rank and (2) when the partial transfer matrix has diagonalizable parts. Thus, we shall carry out independent analyzes in terms of rank and in terms of partially diagonalizable matrices. The following lemmas will be useful.
Lemma 1: In the random linear network coding scheme, P(As > 0) < P(3v: (1(v) > K).
Proof: See the Appendix.
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It follows from this lemma that it is only necessary to consider the case in which K < (1(v). 
where Pi(X = x) represents P(X = xIL = 1).
Approximating the binomial distribution by a normal distribution yields Pi(X = x) 12w(0(5iV) lI)p(l1p) where
Since p -) p* < 1, we can state that, when q -) o0 and p -) 0 is -exp(x2). When K goes to o0, so does x, and hence exp(x2)__ he probability of obtaining X < K -1 symbols is bounded by P(X = K -1); it follows that the probability of decoding X symbols with any 6i (v) < K goes to zero as q and K tend to infinity. U
IV. ALGEBRAIC SECURITY OF THE COMPLETE GRAPH
Notice that, in consequence of the property outlined in Lemma 1, the algebraic security of a graph is topology dependent. A node with 61(v) > K will not necessarily receive a full-rank partial transfer matrix. The rank depends on the available paths between sources and each intermediate node. More specifically, depending on the topology of the graph, some nodes may receive only combinations of symbols derived from matrices with restricted rank, i.e. less than K. This includes, for example, trees, where a node connected directly to the source by a link of capacity C can only have children that receive at most rank C.
As a first step towards general network models, we consider the case of complete acyclic directed graphs G = (V, E), n IV , which can be generated as follows. . Generate random labels for the n vertices. These have some ordering {ei, e2, ...en} associated to them;
. Make an outgoing (directed) edge from the vertex with the minimum label to every vertex with a higher label; Continue until we reach a vertex where there are no more possibilities for connections. This algorithm generates a complete acyclic directed graph with one source, one sink and £EJ = n(n -1)/2 edges, since the total degree of each vertex is n 1 = 1(v) + 6 (v). The source and the sink are naturally determined as those nodes that have only outgoing edges or only incoming edges, respectively. The ordering ensures that this algorithm always generates an acyclic directed graph, conferring the graphs generated in this way specific properties such as the distribution of the in and out-degrees. These properties can be determined directly from the order of the vertex using 5o (v) n -order(v) and 61(v) = n -o(v)-I = order(v) -1.
Before proving our next theorem, we introduce the following lemmas.
Lemma 4: In complete acyclic directed graphs, a node that receives R symbols, receives w.h.p. a partial transfer matrix with rank equal to min(R, K).
Proof: See the Appendix. It follows that the way to secure this class of complete graphs is to transmit at the max-flow min-cut capacity, if necessary by adding "dummy" symbols.
V. CONCLUSIONS
Intrigued by the security potential inherent to random linear network coding, we developed a specific algebraic security criterion, for which we proved a set of key properties. Perhaps one of the most striking conclusions of our analysis is that algebraic security with network coding is very dependent on the topology of the network. As an example, we focused on complete acyclic directed graphs, and determined the secure max-flow, as well as the minimum number of symbols required for algebraic security. As We now consider As(v) at some vertex v. For that, we can consider two distinct cases: the first one is if K < (i (v). In this case, we cannot assume anything about As(v), since the rank of the matrix MI will be dependent on the topology of the network. As for the second case, rank(Mh (a)) < K = As(v) < 0.
Proof of Lemma 2 Contrary to the sum, the product of independent and uniformly distributed values in Fq is not independent and uniformly distributed. In fact, there are two ways to obtain a zero in a multiplication in Fq: (1) by multiplication between an element a C Fq and 0, and (2) by multiplication over two elements a C Fq and b C Fq, such that a 7y 0 and b 7y 0, but ab = 0. Now, the total number of entries of the multiplicative table between q elements of Fq is q2, and there are at most 2q instances of the first case: q instances of ab = 0, a = 0 and b #0O, and q instances of ab = 0, a = O and b #0O. As for the second case, it is possible to prove by contradiction that the number of zeros obtained this way is strictly less than q2: if this was not the case, all products of elements of Fq would be zero, and that is absurd. Since this is true for any q, the number of zeros grows 0(h(q)) < O(q2). Thus, we have P(Xlin = O) < I2q + h(q)
Since for large enough q we have (2 + h(q)) q < 1, it follows that P(Xiin = O)q--,oc = O.
Proof of Lemma 3
Each position of a line of the transfer matrix M is a linear combination of independently and uniformly chosen values in Fq, and thus, the probability of obtaining a zero in a position is given by Lemma Proof of Lemma 4 Suppose that a given intermediate node receives R = K + 0 symbols, 0 > U. It is clear that the maximum possible rank is K and thus there is a way to remove 0 columns s.t. the rank of the resulting set will still be at maximum K. Now consider the case in which vertex v receives at most K symbols. If 
